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SOFT LAW AND THE INTERNATIONAL LAW
OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Pierre-MarieDupuy *
INTRODUCTION

"Soft" law is a paradoxical term for defining an ambiguous phenomenon. Paradoxical because, from a general and classical point of
view, the rule of law is usually considered "hard," i.e., compulsory, or
it simply does not exist. Ambiguous because the reality thus designated, considering its legal effects as well as its manifestations, is often
difficult to identify clearly.
Nevertheless, a new process of normative creation which jurists
feel uncomfortable analyzing does exist and has been developing for
more or less twenty years. "Soft" law certainly constitutes part of the
contemporary law-making process but, as a social phenomenon, it evidently overflows the classical and familiar legal categories by which
scholars usually describe and explain both the creation and the legal
authority of international norms. In other words, "soft" law is a
trouble maker because it is either not yet or not only law.1
This heterogeneity requires that one first consider, without necessarily subscribing to any "sociological" school of thought, the social
reasons for this phenomenon. There seem to be three:
The first reason is structural in nature: it is the existence and development of a ramified network of permanent institutions, both at the
universal and regional levels, since the end of the Second World War.
* Professor of Law, University of Paris; Visiting Professor, University of Michigan Law
School, 1990.
1. See SOCItTE FRANqAISE POUR LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, L'ELABORATION DU DROIT
INTERNATIONAL PUBLIC (1975); E. MCWHINNEY, UNITED NATIONS LAW MAKING 78-79
(1984); CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW-MAKING 66-101 (A. Cassese & J.
Weiler eds. 1988); F. MUNCH, NON-BINDING.AGREEMENTS 1-11 (1969); M. LACHS, SOME REFLECTIONS ON THE SUBSTANCE AND FORM OF INTERNATIONAL LAW, 99-112 (1972); 0.
Schachter, The Existence of Nonbinding InternationalAgreements, 71 AM. J. INT'L L. 296
(1977); R. Baxter, International Law in "Her Infinite Variety," 29 INT'L & COMP. L.Q. 549
(1980); Bothe, Legal and Non-Legal Norms - A Meaningful Distinction in InternationalRelations?, 1INETHERLANDS Y.B. INT'L L. 65 (1980); Weil, Towards Relative Normativity in InternationalLaw?, 77 AM. J. INT'L L. 413 (1983); Virally, La Distinction entre Textes Internationaux
de PortieJuridique et Textes InternationauxDipourvus de Portie Juridique,60-I ANNUAIRE DE
L'INSTITUT DE DROIT INTERNATIONAL [A.I.D.I.] 166 (1983); Dilibdrationsde l'Institut en Seances Pliniires, Premire Sdance Plinire,60-Il A.I.D.I. 117 (1984) (M. Virally, rapporteur);
Aust, The Theory and Practice of Informal InternationalInstruments, 35 INT'L & COMP. L.Q.
787 (1986).
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The "UN family" of organizations plays the leading role here. These
institutions offer the world community a standing structure of cooperation which makes it possible to organize permanent and on-going
political, economic and normative negotiations among the member
States of this community. Furthermore, the increasingly important
function of non-governmental organizations provides an efficient complement to the existing intergovernmental framework by assuring, in
particular, a dynamic relationship between inter-State diplomacy and
2
international public opinion.
The second reason is the diversification of the components of this
world community. Since the late 1950s, the arrival of underdeveloped
countries on the international stage has made it necessary to adapt and
reconsider, by way of normative negotiation, a great number of international customary norms which had been elaborated at a time when
these countries were not in existence as sovereign States. It is well
known that these new States, having the weight of the majority without the power of the elder countries, have speculated on the utilization
of "soft" instruments, such as resolutions and recommendations of international bodies, with a view toward modifying a number of the
main rules and principles of the international legal order.
The last and most important element, closely linked to the previous one, is best characterized by the rapid evolution of the world economy and increasing State interdependence combined with the
development of new fields of activity created by.the unceasing progress
of science and technology. This phenomenon requires the timely creaion of new branches of international law that are adaptable and applicable to each new level of achievement reached as a result of
technological advancement. Thus, international economic law3 and
international law relating to the protection of the human environment
are areas in which new "soft" regulations have emerged in predominant fashion.
The inter-relationship among these three elements, even if complex, is nonetheless quite evident: the steady evolution and adaptation
of these new norms necessitate a constant renegotiation which usually
takes place within the many organs of international organizations.
One could say that the "soft" law "wave" reflects both, on the one
hand, a desire for a new type of law rendered necessary by the previ2. M. BETTATI & P.-M. Dupuy, LES ONG ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL (1986).
3. An important component of international economic law, for instance, has to do with the
relationship between international law and economic development. See generally, LA FORMATION DES NORMES EN DROIT INTERNATIONAL Du D1tVELOPPEMENT (M. Flory, A. Mahiou &
J. Henry eds. 1984).
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ously enunciated factors and, on the other, a certain fear that existing
law is too rigid - either too difficult to be rigorously applied by the
poorest countries or incapable of adapting to the rapidly evolving areas which it is supposed to cover and regulate.
It would, however, be a mistake to believe that, given these considerations, "soft" law is solely an attribute of international law. For
partly the same reasons, particularly given the rapid evolution of scientific advances, one can observe its appearance in certain domains of
municipal law. For example, very few countries have yet adopted precise legislation providing for normative regulation of genetic research
and its applications in "assisted procreation." The preference has instead been to define, through various institutions and procedures, a
variety of "soft" ethical guidelines addressed to scientists and physicians without resorting to laws, decrees or other "hard" legal instruments. That this phenomenon is common nowadays is one of the
many reasons why "soft" law should not be considered a "normative
sickness" but rather a symbol of contemporary times and a product of
4
necessity.
Because the existing body of international environmental law has,
in part, emerged on the basis of "soft" norms, it provides a good field
for observing the general sociological and juridical phenomenon
termed "soft" law. The 1972 Stockholm Declaration adopted by the
UN Conference on the Human Environment, for example, constitutes
the normative program for the world community 'in this field.
Although, from a formal point of view, the Declaration is only a nonbinding resolution, many of its "principles," particularly Principle 21,
have been relied upon by governments to justify their legal rights and
duties. The subsequent State practice has been, no doubt, influenced
by such provisions. It is in this context and with the benefit of these
introductory remarks that we shall briefly and successively examine
the creation (I), the forms and content (II), and the legal effects (III)
of "soft" law in the field of international environmental law.

I.

CREATION OF SOFT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

A.

The InstitutionalFramework

The primary function assumed by international institutions in the
international "soft" law-making process has already been illustrated.
In practice, the development of "soft" law norms with regard to the
protection of the human environment began immediately after the
Stockholm Conference, one of the consequences of which was the cre4. Contra Weil, supra note 1, at 413-23, 441-42.
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ation of a special subsidiary organ of the UN General Assembly devoted to the promotion of both universal and regional environmental
law. This body, the United Nations Environment Program
("UNEP"), has played a leading role in the promotion of regional conventions aimed at, for example, protecting seas against pollution.
Although it was not supposed to develop in such a manner, UNEP has
also evolved into a standing structure for negotiating draft resolutions
sent, after their elaboration, to the General Assembly, where their
contents have been either passed as is or expressly referred to in resolutions. A prime example of this phenomenon is provided by the 1978
UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct in the Field of the Environment
for the Guidance of States in the Conservation and Harmonious Utilization of Natural Resources Shared by Two or More States.5
At the regional level in general and in Europe in particular, several
international institutions have engaged in important activities related
to environmental protection: the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development ("OECD"), which, in particular, has adopted
a series of recommendations conceived of as a follow-up to the Universal Stockholm Declaration regarding the prevention and abatement of
transfrontier pollution; 6 the EEC which has adopted Programmes of
Action for the Environment, on the basis of which "hard" law is later
established, mainly by way of "directive"; 7 and the Council of Europe,
which, even before the recent, intense international cooperation in this
field, was perhaps the first international intergovernmental institution
to bring to the attention of States the necessity of protecting the
environment."
The action of non-governmental organizations ("NGOs") has also
contributed to the enunciation of:"soft" law principles regarding the
environment. The International Law Association ("ILA"), for example, adopted an influential resolution in 1966 known as the Helsinki
Rules on the Use of Waters of International Rivers 9 which was ex5. Report on the Intergovernmental Working Group of Experts on Natural Resources Shared
by Two or More States on the Work of its Fifth Session Held in Nairobifrom January 23, to
February 7, 1978 (D. Kinyanjui, rapporteur) [UNEP Governing Council decision 6/14 of May
19, 1978], reprinted in 17 I.L.M. 1094, 1097 (1978)[hereinafter UNEP Draft Principles of
Conduct].
6. See ORGANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT AND THE ENVIRONMENT (1986) [hereinafter OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT], which contains OECD resolutions dealing with the protection of the environment.
7. See, e.g., Council Directive of 15 July 1980 on Air Quality Limit Values and Guide Values

for Sulphur Dioxide and Suspended Particulates,23 O.J. EUR. COMM. (No. L 229) 30 (1980).
8. See, e.g., Resolution 71(5) on Air Pollution in FrontierAreas, 1971 EUR. Y.B. (Council of

Eur.) 263.
9. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION,
(HELSINKI) 477 (1966).

REPORT OF THE FIFrY-SECOND CONFERENCE
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panded and enlarged by the same institution in 1982 with the adoption
of the Montreal Rules of International Law Applicable to Transfrontier Pollution.' 0 The Institute of International Law ("IIL") has
played an equally important role by promulgating resolutions on the
Utilization of Non-Maritime International Waters;I' on the Pollution
of Rivers and Lakes and International Law;1 2 and on Transboundary
3
Air Pollution.'
In this context, the regional commissions of the United Nations
play a role that could become more important in the near future. This
is reflected in the recent Bergen Declaration adopted on May 14, 1990,
by thirty environment ministers at a meeting convened jointly by the
United Nations Economic Commission for Europe and the government of Norway. ' 4 One can find in the terms of this declaration different considerations, guidelines and principles which echo those of other
contemporary declarations such as the Declaration on Human Responsibilities for Peace and Sustainable Development proposed a year
earlier by Costa Rica,' 5 or the Declaration of Environmental Interdependence adopted by the Interparliamentary Conference on the
Global Environment in Washington, D.C. on May 2, 1990.16
B.

The Soft Lawmaking Process

As with other areas in which "soft" law plays a part, repetition is a
very important factor in the international environmental "soft" lawmaking process. All of the international bodies referred to above
should be viewed, as far as their recommendatory action in this field is
concerned, as transmitting basically the same message. Cross-references from one institution to another, the recalling of guidelines
adopted by other apparently concurrent international authorities, recurrent invocation of the same rules formulated in one way or another
at the universal, regional and more restricted levels, all tend progressively to develop and establish a common international understanding.
As a result of this process, conduct and behavior which would have
10. INTERNATIONAL LAW ASSOCIATION, REPORT OF THE SIXTIETH CONFERENCE (MON-

1 (1982).
11. 49-I A.I.D.I. 381 (1961).

TREAL)

12. 58-I A.I.D.I. 196 (1979).

13. 62-11 A.I.D.I. 296 (1987).
14. See Bergen: Weak DeclarationAdopted, 20 ENVTL. POL'Y & L. 84 (1990).
15. See Human Responsibilitiesfor Peace and SustainableDevelopment, 19 ENVTL. POL'Y &

L. 232 (1989).
16. See The InterparliamentaryConference on the Global Environment, 20 ENVTL. POL'Y &
L. 112 (1990).
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been considered challenges to State sovereignty twenty years ago are
now accepted within the mainstream.
Let us examine, by way of illustration, four substantial examples of
this phenomenon in the context of international environmental "soft"
law. The first example involves the principle of information and consultation. This principle usually manifests itself as an obligation
whereby States must inform and consult one another, prior to engaging in any activity or initiative that is likely to cause transfrontier pollution, so that the country of origin of the potentially dangerous
activity may take into consideration the interests of any potentially
exposed country. From a more general point of view, the principle
covers the additional duty to provide to these potentially exposed
States all relevant and reasonably available information concerning
transboundary natural resources and transfrontier environmental
7
interference.1
The principle of information and consultation has been reiterated
for almost twenty years by the different organizations cited above as
well as by others. It can be found in many recommendations or resolutions: the aforementioned 1978 UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct
on Shared Natural Resources; UN General Assembly resolutions 3129
(XXVIII) of December 1973 and 3281 (the Charter of Economic
Rights and Duties of States); 18 OECD Council recommendations on
Transfrontier Pollution19 and the Implementation of a Regime of
Equal Right of Access and Non-Discrimination in Relation to Transfrontier Pollution. 20 In the context of NGO activity, the same rule is
17. For a presentation of duties of States with regard to the protection of the environment,
see generally Handl, TerritorialSovereignty and the Problem of TransnationalPollution, 69 AM.
J. INT'L L. 50 (1975). See also Handl, Balancing of Interests and InternationalLiabilityfor the
Pollution of International Watercourses: Customary Principles of Law Revisited, 13 CANADIAN
Y.B. INT'L L. 156 (1975); Dupuy, Bilan de Recherches de la Section de Langue Franqaise du
Centre D'Etude et de Recherche de L'Acadimie, in LA POLLUTION TRANSFRONTIIRE ET LE
DROIT INTERNATIONAL 33 (1985) (publication of the Centre for Studies and Research in International Law and International Relations, Hague Academy of International Law); Lammers,
The Present State of Research CarriedOut by the Centrefor Studies and Research, in LA POLLUTION TRANSFRONTItRE ET LE DROIT INTERNATIONAL, supra; WORLD COMMISSION ON THE
ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, EXPERT GROUP ON ENVIRONMENTAL LAW, LEGAL
PRINCIPLES FOR ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT (1986).

18. G.A. Res. 3129, 28 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 30), U.N. Doc. A/Res./3050-3199; G.A.
Res. 3281, 29 U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 31), U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974), reprinted in 14 I.L.M. 251
(1975). UN bodies other than UNEP, such as the ECOSOC Commission on Transnational Corporations, also work on environmental matters and produce "soft" standards for environmental
protection. See, e.g., Transnational Corporationsand Issues Relating to the Environment, U.N.
Doc. E/C.10/1987/12 (1987).
19. OECD Council Recommendation C(74)224, Annex, Title E (1974), reprinted in OECD
AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 142, 145.
20. OECD Council Recommendation C(77)28(final), Annex, Title C (1977), reprinted in
OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 150, 153.
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contained in the already-mentioned ILA resolutions of 1966 and 1982,
as well as in the IIL resolutions of 1961, 1979 and 1981.
The second example concerns, on a more specific level, environmental impact assessment procedures. These procedures are directly
related to the principle of information and consultation since they
make it possible to estimate the impact of a planned activity on the
environment of a neighboring State. 2 1 Adherence to such procedures
has been recommended several times by various sources, such as the
1978 UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct on Shared Natural Resources and the 1981 UNEP Conclusions of the Study on the Legal
Aspects Concerning the Environment Related to Off-Shore Mining
and Drilling within the Limits of National Jurisdiction. 22 These
UNEP recommendations have both been endorsed by the UN General
Assembly in its Resolution No. 37/27 of March 24, 1983, on International Co-operation in the Field of the Environment, as well as in its
resolution No. 37/7 on the World Charter for Nature (articles eleven
and sixteen).
Support for the same procedures can be found in the 1974 OECD
Declaration on Environmental Policy and other recommendations
adopted by the same organization. 23 A faithful echo of the same rule
can also be found in a 1985 EEC Council Directive pertaining to the
Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and Private Projects on the
Environment. 24 It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that this
type of rule has only been recognized by industrialized countries; it
was, for instance, recognized and recommended by the Economic
Commission for Africa Council of Ministers in 1984.25
The third example of repetition in the international "soft" lawmaking process is provided by the principle of non-discriminationaccording to which States should not substantially differentiate between
their own environment and those of other States as regards the elaboration and application of laws and regulations in the areas of prevention, reparation and repression of pollution. With regard to instances
of transfrontier inland pollution, States must also allow persons concerned with such occurrences access to available administrative and
21. U.N. Doc. UNEP/ENV/GE.l/R.I/Rev.l (1984).
22. The Environment Program:Program PerformanceReport January-April1981, U.N. Doc.
UNEP/GC.9/5/Add.5 at 36 (1981).
23. Declaration on Environmental Policy (Nov. 14, 1974), reprintedin OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 15.

24. Council Directive of27 June 1985 on the Assessment of the Effects of Certain Public and
Private Projects on the Environment, art. 7, 28 O.J. Eur. Com. (No. L 175) 40, 42 (1985).
25. Economic Commission for Africa, Annual Report, 69 U.N. ESCOR Supp. (No. 11) para.
2, U.N. Doc. E/ECA/CM.10/38 (1984).
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judicial proceedings. 26
The principle of non-discrimination has been introduced quite systematically in OECD Council recommendations concerned with transfrontier pollution, in particular, recommendation C(77)28. One can
also find this principle in the 1978 Draft Principles Relating to Shared
Natural Resources and in several of the other recommendations already mentioned. 27 It is interesting to note that, in this area and on
the basis of those programmatory instruments, the same principle has
been introduced in a "hard" instrument, namely the 1982 UN Con28
vention on the Law of the Sea.

The final and most recent example of convergence between nonlegally-binding texts of different natures and origins is to be found in
contemporary approaches to the problems surrounding the protection
of the global atmosphere. The number of "soft" instruments calling
on the world community to strengthen international cooperation on
the basis of a new "global" approach and the perception of the world
atmosphere as part of the "common heritage of mankind" has been
increasing in the past two to three years. If this phenomenon continues, it will likely have some legal consequence, particularly with regard to the environmental responsibility that the present generation
29
has vis-A-vis future generations.
The contemporary "common heritage" approach is reflected, for
example, in the UN General Assembly Resolution 43/53 of January
27, 1989, in which it is recognized "that climate change is a common
concern of mankind .... ,,ao A second reference can be found in the
statement agreed to by the International Meeting of Legal and Policy
Experts hosted by the Canadian government in Ottawa on February
20-22, 1989. This statement takes the form of a draft convention on
the protection of the world climate and global atmosphere. It declares
that "the atmosphere ... constitutes a common resource of vital interest to mankind.13 1 Another text which can be cited in this context is
26. See OECD,

NON-DISCRIMINATION

LEADING DOCUMENTS

IN RELATION TO TRANSFRONTIER

(1978) [hereinafter OECD,

POLLUTION:

NON-DISCRIMINATION].

27. OECD, NON-DISCRIMINATION, supra note 26, at para. 11.
28. See, e.g., Third United Nations Conference on the Law of the Sea, United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.62/122, arts. 194(4) and 227 (1982), reprinted in
21 I.L.M. 1261 (1982).

29.

See WEISS, IN FAIRNESS TO FUTURE GENERATIONS: INTERNATIONAL LAW COMMON

PATRIMONY AND INTERGENERATIONAL EQUITY (1989); D'Amato, Do We Owe a Duty to Future Generationsto Preserve the Global Environment?, 84 AM. J. INT'L L. 190 (1990).
30. Protection of Global Climate for Present and Future Generations of Mankind, U.N. Doc.
A/Res/43/53, para. 1 (1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1326, 1327 (1989).
31. STATEMENT OF THE MEETING OF LEGAL AND POLICY EXPERTS, PROTECTION OF THE
ATMOSPHERE: INTERNATIONAL

1989)(Ottawa).

MEETING OF LEGAL AND POLICY EXPERTS (February

22,
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the Hague Declaration of March 11, 1989, signed by representatives of
twenty-four States at the Hague at the initiative of France, the Netherlands and Norway. The Declaration states that it is the "duty of the
community of nations vis-A-vis present and future generations to do all
that can be done to preserve the quality of the atmosphere. ' 32 Support
for the same approach can also be found in the different reports of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climatic Change established in 1989
under the co-sponsorship of the World Meterological Organization
and UNEP 33 and in the Decision on Global Climate Change adopted
34
by the UNEP Governing Council in May 1989.
These various texts appear to define a new trend which may eventually lead to the negotiation of a new general multilateral convention
on the protection of the world climate. The adoption of such a convention has been called for, in particular, by the Noordwijk Declaration on Climate Change adopted at a ministerial conference of
representatives of sixty-seven governments from every part of the
3
world in November 1989. 5
But these "soft" instruments, as is the case with others usually referred to in the general context of the "soft" law phenomenon, are in
many respects rather heterogeneous in nature. Their substantial convergence does not create a new binding rule of international environmental law. This remark leads both to methodological problems,
which will be dealt with later in this article, and necessitates a more
thorough examination of the forms and content of "soft" environmental law.

II.

THE FORMS AND CONTENT OF SOFT ENVIRONMENTAL LAW

The examples provided earlier illustrate that much of "soft" law is

incorporated within "soft" (i.e., non-binding) instruments such as recommendations and resolutions of international organizations, declarations and "final acts" published at the conclusion of international
conferences and even draft proposals elaborated by groups of experts.
It is thus generally understood that "soft" law creates and delineates
goals to be achieved in the future rather than actual duties, programs
rather than prescriptions, guidelines rather than strict obligations. It
32. Hague Declaration on the Environment, 28 I.L.M. 1308, 1309 (1989).
33. See, IPCC (WHO/UNEP) World Climate Program Publications Series, No. IPCC-1/
TD-W.267.
34. United Nations Environment Program, Governing Council Decision on Global Climate
Change, UNEP GC Dec. 15/36 (May 25, 1989), reprinted in 28 I.L.M. 1330 (1989).
35. MINISTERIAL CONFERENCE ON ATMOSPHERIC POLLUTION AND CLIMATE CHANGE,

THE NOORDWIJK DECLARATION ON CLIMATE CHANGE (Nov. 1989).
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is true that in the majority of cases the "softness" of the instrument
corresponds to the "softness" of its contents. After all, the very nature
of "soft" law lies in the fact that it is not in itself legally binding.
Although this assertion is generally correct, it remains necessary
both from a conceptual and, in certain situations, a practical point of
view, to distinguish clearly between the substance and the instrument
they are not necessarily always in perfect accordance with one another. Two kinds of situations present themselves in which this type
of potential incoherence can be observed. First, there are cases where
the content of a formally non-binding instrument has been so precisely
defined and formulated that, aside from the precaution of using
"should" instead of "shall" to determine the proper behavior for concerned States, some of its provisions could be perfectly integrated into
36
a treaty.
Moreover, it is extremely interesting to observe in practice, as the
author has had the opportunity of doing in his capacity as legal advisor to the OECD Transfrontier Pollution Group (1974-80), that Member States' delegations approach the negotiation of those provisions
with extreme care, just as if they were negotiating treaty provisions.
Such behavior suggests that States do not view such "soft" recommendations as devoid of at least some political significance, if not, in the
long term, any legal significance. In fact, for a few of these "soft"
instruments, some States consider it necessary to 'formulate reservations to such texts, just as if they were creating formal legal obligations. The most famous example of this is the UN 1974 Charter on
Economic Rights and Duties; this is also true for the OECD Council
Recommendation C(74)224 on Some Principles Concerning Trans37
frontier Pollution.
Second, an increasing number of treaty provisions can be found in
which the wording used is so "soft" that it seems impossible to consider them as creating a precise obligation or burden on States parties.
The number of conventions in which such evasive prescriptions are
enunciated appears to be increasing: for instance, many provisions of
Part XII of the 1982 UN Convention on the Law of the Sea (e.g.,
articles 204(1) and 217(2)); the majority of the articles of the 1979
Economic Commission for Europe Convention on Long-Range Trans36. See, e.g., Principles Concerning Transfrontier Pollution, OECD Council Recommendation

C(74)224 Annex (1974), reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 142;
UNEP Draft Principles of Conduct, supra note 5.

37. The Spanish delegation made several reservations to the Council Recommendation. The
reservations were, however, withdrawn after several years. See OECD Council Recommendation C(74)224 Annex (1974), reprinted in OECD AND THE ENVIRONMENT, supra note 6, at 14447.
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boundary Air Pollution;3 8 as well as the provisions of the 1985 Vienna
39
Convention on the Protection of the Ozone Layer.
Such a situation can sometimes, if not often, be explained in light
of the difficulties with which delegations have been confronted in trying to reach an agreement. This is certainly the case in the second of
the last three cited examples. Another factor which explains the inclusion of "soft" provisions in the text of a treaty can, however, be identified: with regard to difficult and complex areas of concern, the
protection of the ozone layer for example, States realize from the outset of negotiation that easy solutions do not exist and that too rigidlydefined obligations would only lead to inefficiency by deterring a significant number of concerned governments from ratifying the
convention.
Thus, States prefer to define, by common agreement, programs of
action which invite them to adopt, starting at the national level, adequate material and regulatory measures. One can assume that such a
prudent strategy has been encouraged by the example furnished by the
positive results often produced when States effectively take into account the guidelines proposed in some of the resolutions or recommendations defined within the framework of international organizations.
One percieves, then, a sort of "soft" law "contagion" which affects the
transformation of "soft" instruments into "hard" ones.
Even given the accuracy of this assertion, one must recognize that
it does not simplify the task of defining the scope and nature of the
"soft" law. It does, however, lead to the conclusion that the criteria
used to identify "soft" law should no longer be formal, i.e., based on
the compulsory or non-compulsory character of the instrument, but
instead substantial,i.e., dependent on the nature and specificity of the
behavior requested of the State, whether or not it is included in a legally binding instrument. To be more rigorous, if the norm is included
in a non-binding instrument, it should be considered presumptive evidence of the "soft" nature of the norm; at the same time, the "hard"
or "soft" nature of the obligation defined in a treaty provision should
not necessarily be identified on the sole basis of the formally binding
character of the legal instrument in which the concerned norm is integrated and articulated.
These observations lead to the conclusion that the identification of
"soft" law, significant at least because it may potentially become
38. United Nations Convention on Long-Range Transboundary Air Pollution, U.N. Doc.
ECE/HLM.I/R.I (1979), reprinted in 18 I.L.M. 1442 (1979).
39. Vienna Convention for the Protection of the Ozone Layer, opened for signature Mar. 22,

1985, U.N. Doc. UNEP/IG.53/5/Rev. 1, reprinted in 26 I.L.M. 1529 (1987).
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"hard" law in the near or distant future, should derive from a systematic case-by-case examination in which a variety of factors are carefully considered. These factors would include, among others: the
source and origin of the text (governmental or not); the conditions,
both formal and political, of its adoption; its intrinsic aptitude to become a norm of international law; and the practical reaction of States
to its statement. These criteria should be applied, for example, to the
various texts mentioned earlier calling for a mankind-oriented and
global approach to world climate protection. In other words, one
must avoid grouping texts of remote origins and character in order to
demonstrate the development of an emerging "soft" rule.

III.

THE LEGAL EFFECT OF ENVIRONMENTAL SOFT LAW

Two different sets of problems must be considered with respect to a
discussion of the legal impact of international environmental "soft"

law. The first set of problems concerns the question of the influence of

"soft" law on the general international law-making process. How and
under what conditions do some "soft" norms become compulsory?
The second set of problems is twofold: even before their evolution into
"hard" laws, do existing "soft" regulations have any influence on the
definition of the content of international law? If so, does this have any
impact on the international responsibility of States for the commission
of wrongful acts?
Again, it should be clearly noted that the international law of the
environment is explored and used as an example here merely because
it provides a fertile ground for analysis and not because it is a field in
which "soft" law presents any particular theoretical or technical
problems.
A.

Soft Law and General InternationalLaw

The law-making process is a long-term process. This remains true
even if the notion of "long-term" is a relative one - the prevailing
conception of "long-term," as hinted by the International Court of
Justice in the Continental Shelf case, is one which has tended to
shorten over the last decades. 4°
As early as Roman times, jurists spoke of leges in statu nascendi
(not to be confused with lex ferenda). It is sufficiently clear that the
creative process of customary rules enables different heterogeneous elements to participate in the crystallization of the new custom. It be40. North Sea Continental Shelf (W. Ger. v. Den. and W. Ger. v. Neth.), 1969 I.C.J. 3, 42-43
(Judgment of Feb. 20).
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comes equally obvious that the accumulation of recurrent resolutions
can greatly contribute to the creation of such a new general customary
rule. It should also be noted in this context that positive cross-references between treatiesand resolutions (both types of instruments incorporating the same rule at the same time) are of real importance in this
respect.
In the context of "soft" instruments, one could say, using the classical working of legal theory in regard to the creation of custom, that
the cumulative enunciation of the same guideline by numerous nonbinding texts helps to express the opiniojurisof the world community.
This last observation, although different in character, should be
viewed in light of the one made in 1986 by the International Court of
Justice with regard to several important resolutions adopted by the
UN General Assembly: "The effect of consent to the text of such resolutions ... may be understood as an acceptance of the validity of the
rule or set of rules declared by the resolution by themselves. ' 41 One
should certainly not systematically go that far in interpreting the frequent repetition of "soft" rules in different kinds of texts. However,
taking into account the criteria outlined earlier at the end of Part I of
this article, one should pay careful attention to indications of a new
opiniojurislikely to emerge among nations thanks to the frequent reiteration of certain identical principles.
This conclusion is somewhat problematic, however, if one takes
into account the rather dogmatic concepts and legal categories
presented by the classical theory identifying the "two elements" of
customary law (practice and opinio juris) when analyzing the "soft"
law phenomenon. 42 This classical theory has been systematized by the
positivist school to explain a law-making process in which the measure
and conception of time was substantially different, and where the rule
of law appeared as the end product of a long and careful ripening
process.
Today, even given the heterogeneity of the contemporary law-making process, it would not be completely accurate to conclude that the
relative importance of these two elements has been reversed so that the
voicing of opinio juris takes precedence over the material element of
State practice. 43 It would be more consistent with the reality of this
process to say that, through the channel of steadfast institutionalized
41. Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua (Nicar. v. U.S.), 1986
I.C.J. 4, 100 (Merits of June 27).

42. See Haggenmacher, La Doctrine des Deux Elements du Droit Coutoumier dans la Pratique de la Cour Internationale,90 R.G.D.I.P. 5 (1986).
43. CHANGE AND STABILITY IN INTERNATIONAL LAW MAKING, supra note 1.
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negotiation, State practice is modified by the constant pressure of diplomacy. In this respect, general international law-making is no
longer, if it has ever effectively been, a process characterized by the
explicit recognition of "general practice accepted as law." 44 As a result, "soft" law must also be viewed in light of the interaction of competing legal strategies pursued by different categories of States whose
varied interests are not always considered by other States to be converging. In any event, it is evident that a substantial part of "soft" law
today, in an impressionistic way, describes part of the "hard" law of
tomorrow.
The normative emission of international institutions plays a catalytic role in this process. For example, one could argue convincingly
that the information and consultation requirement has nearly reached
the point beyond which it should be considered a customary norm.
Evidence of this can be found in both the methodology and materials
used by several groups of experts charged with the task of establishing
draft codification articles describing the content of the general international law of the environment. Both the 1987 recommendations of the
World Commission on Environment and Development Expert Group
on Environmental Law45 and the ILC draft articles on the law of nonnavigational uses of international watercourses" provide major examples. Both drafts have been supported by reports and commentaries
which both take into account and largely rely upon "soft" instruments
emanating from international organizations, even if not necessarily
consistently confirmed by actual and unanimous State practice.
This last element makes it difficult to identify among the codified
principles the ones which already belong to lex lata and those which
are still to be considered as lex ferenda. It does, however, sufficiently
establish that the codifying bodies consider "soft" law at the very least
to be a reliable indicator of actual trends in contemporary international environmental law-making. Rules and principles such as regular exchange of information, prior notification of planned activities
capable of damaging the environment in a neighboring country, equal
right of access to and non-discrimination between actual or potential
victims of transfrontier pollution behind and across the frontiers, have

44. I.C.J. STATUTE art. 38.
45. WORLD COMMISSION ON ENVIRONMENT AND DEVELOPMENT, supra note 14.

46. In particular, see InternationalLaw Commission: Sixth Report on the Law of the NonNavigational Uses of International Watercourses, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/427 (1990)(S. McCaffrey,
Special Rapporteur); Draft Report of the InternationalLaw Commission on the Work of its FortySecond Session, U.N. Doc. A/CN.4/L.449 (1990).
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been largely launched by "soft" instruments which are now explicitly
cited and recalled as valuable materials in the codification process.
B.

Soft Law and InternationalResponsibility

A "soft" norm can help to define the standards of good behavior
corresponding to what is nowadays to be expected from a "well-governed State" without having been necessarily consecrated as an inforce customary norm. Among those standards of good behavior
which constitute the type of due diligence that can be expected from a
State in the context of international cooperation are: prior consultation before enforcing a regulation or empowering a private person to
undertake an activity which might create a significant risk of transfrontier pollution; early international notification of a polluting accident; due recourse to procedures of impact assessments; and nondiscrimination between and equality of access for victims of both national and transfrontier pollution. 4 7 These and other standards of behavior were recognized in the context of a due diligence definition by
48
the arbitrators in the famous Alabama Case.
Another indirect effect of international "soft" law regulations
should not be underestimated: the impact of these "soft" norms on
national legislatures and national legislation as reference models which
anticipate internationally-grounded State obligations emerging in the
near future.
When evaluating due diligence in the context of determining State
responsibility under international law, one must consider the standards established by "soft" norms, although not (or not yet) compulsory in themselves. No single one of these standards by itself, it seems,
should suffice in identifying illicit State activity in instances where it is
ignored. Such a deficiency should, however, create a presumption of
illegality and, in instances where a number of such norms are violated,
49
constitute evidence of an illicit act.
Of course, the evaluation of compliance with such standards of
"good behavior" falls within the jurisdiction of international judges or
arbitrators. From the point of view of international environmental
law, it is disturbing to note the absence of recent arbitral or jurisdic47. Dupuy, Due Diligence in the International Law of Liability, in LEGAL ASPECTS OF
TRANSFRONTIER POLLUTION 369 (1977); Dupuy, Le Fait Gdnirateur de la Responsabiliti Internationale des Etats, 188 RECUEIL DES COURs 21 (1984).
48. In the United States, see, e.g., Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95213, 17 I.L.M. 214 (1978).
49. For an appraisal of international safety standards in the field of nuclear energy, see
Handl, Aprds Tchernobyl. Quelques Reflexions sur le Programme Legislatif Multilateral d
L'Ordre du Jour, 92 R.G.D.I.P. 5 (1988).
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tional awards; States do not appear to be very keen on settling disputes
in this area by entrusting them to independent third parties. Each
State knows that rules of law and material situations are reversible and
that a country victimized by transboundary pollution today could very
well end up being the polluter of tomorrow.
Nevertheless, international standards based on "soft" law are not
only available for use by international judges or arbitrators. They can
also be of great help in every day inter-State diplomacy. They may
also effectively be taken into account by municipal judges in evaluating
the legality, with regard to international law, of any internal administrative action having had or able to have some damaging impact on
the environment beyond national boundaries. Furthermore, municipal judges may take these international standards into account in order to give a correct interpretation to very generally formulated
international obligations.
Albeit indirect, the legal effect of "soft" law is nevertheless real.
"Soft" law is not merely a new term for an old (customary) process; it
is both a sign and product of the permanent state of multilateral cooperation and competition among the heterogeneous members of the
contemporary world community.
The existence of "soft" law compels us to re-evaluate the general
international law-making process and, in doing so, illuminates the difficulty of explaining this phenomenon by referring solely to the classical theory of formal sources of public international law.

